

International Arbitration Law Library

CORRUPTION IN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION

by

ABDULHAY SAYED

LL.B. (Damascus), LL.M (Harvard)

DES, Ph.D. (IUHEI - Geneva)

KLUWER LAW INTERNATIONAL

THE HAGUE / LONDON / NEW YORK

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